![]() Accordingly, the genuine comparison at issue will not originate primarily and merely on the level of concepts and propositions, but can only be achieved through inter-paradigmatic conditions, where we have the sharp awareness of a paradigms boundary from which we can attempt to achieve situational communication with another paradigm. A philosophical paradigm does facilitate the attendance of such a situation, but it is also possible for the situation to emerge between paradigms in a gamesome way. It is to be argued that the original possibility of comparison depends on the comparative situation, i.e., the mechanism of meaning-production that functions in a non-universalistic and anonymous way. It will be shown that to attribute the difficulty of cross-cultural comparisons to incommensurability of traditions is irrelevant and misleading. Further, the connection of the comparative paradox with the obstacles met by cross-cultural philosophical comparisons will be demonstrated. It is a theoretical difficulty for the philosophical tendency represented by Platos theory of Ideas to justify comparative activities. First, the comparison paradox will be expounded. ![]() ![]() The paper is to show that the foregoing common belief is incorrect and therewith to inquire into the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical comparison. It is commonly believed that philosophical comparison depends on having some common measure or standard between and above the compared parts.
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